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Abstract 
 
In April 2000, Japan embarked on a reform of its health care market. Along with the introduction 
of the long-term care insurance scheme, the government for the first time allowed for-profit 
operators to compete head-on with non-profit operators in the provision of at-home care services. 
Taking advantage of a unique and rich micro-level survey, this study is the first to examine wage 
differentials between the nonprofit and the for-profit sector in Japan’s nursing care industry, 
concentrating on home helpers and staff nurses. Controlling for nonrandom unobserved selection 
biases, our results show that a nonprofit wage premium exists. This finding supports the 
hypothesis that nonprofit providers operate under non-distributional constraints.   
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and Social Research Institute or of the Japanese government.    All errors are our own.    3
1.  Introduction 
  In 2000, the Japanese government embarked on an ambitious program to reform the 
country’s health care system.    In addition to the introduction of a long-term care insurance 
scheme, the market for the provision of at-home care for the elderly was liberalized.    Until 2000, 
at-home care for the elderly was provided under the state welfare program, with those qualifying 
being assigned to a nonprofit provider by local government officials.    At-home care services by 
for-profit providers were not reimbursed by the government, so that only the wealthy were able to 
afford them, and the market was correspondingly small (Shimizutani and Noguchi, 2004; 
Mitchell et al., 2004).    Following the reform, patients are now allowed to choose freely between 
nonprofit and for-profit providers and make a copayment of 10 percent of the cost, with the 
remainder covered by the long-term care health insurance, no matter what type of provider they 
choose.    Thus, for the first time, for-profit providers are able to compete directly with nonprofit 
providers in the home-help market.   
This situation provides an exceptional opportunity to test whether there is a nonprofit 
wage premium in the market for long-term care.    Economic theory provides conflicting 
hypotheses regarding the wage setting behavior of different types of providers.    On the one hand, 
information asymmetries prevent consumers from judging the quality of services in advance, 
providing incentives for opportunistic behavior by for-profit operators, which might be tempted 
to raise profits by lowering wages.
2    On the other hand, wages in the nonprofit sector might be 
lower, for example as a result of “labor donation.”    According to this hypothesis, employees in 
the nonprofit sector may be willing to accept lower wages in exchange for non-monetary benefits, 
such as the satisfaction derived from providing socially valuable services.    The Japanese 
                                                   
2  Lower wages, in turn, might lead to a lower quality of services, and it is this potential problem of 
opportunistic behavior that provided the rationale for the traditional policy of barring for-profit providers from  4
at-home care market provides an ideal set-up for an examination of wage differentials between 
nonprofit and for-profit providers because output prices are regulated by the government and care 
users are guaranteed government-subsidized access to any type of provider. 
Despite this innovative institutional change, surprisingly, there has been little research on 
nonprofit wage differentials in Japan.    This study utilizes a large and unique employer-employee 
matched micro-level database to analyze sectoral wage differentials for home helpers and staff 
nurses, the occupational groups accounting for the largest portion‐about 40 percent of all 
employees – in our dataset.    Our empirical findings confirm the existence of a nonprofit wage 
premium in Japan’s at-home care market and thus offer important policy implications for the 
design of market competition in other regulated industries such as medical or educational 
services. 
The paper is organized as follows.    The next section briefly reviews the theoretical 
literature and previous research on earnings differentials.    Section 3 provides an outline of 
Japan’s long-term care insurance program.    Next, Section 4 describes the data for our empirical 
analysis.    Section 5 presents the empirical results, evaluates which factors contribute to the wage 
differentials and discusses the findings.    The last section concludes. 
 
2.  Review of the literature 
In contrast with the very limited number of studies on Japan, there is a large body of 
literature on nonprofit wage in the United States.    Most of these studies test the competing 
hypotheses of a wage premium either in the nonprofit or in the for-profit sector. 
The starting point of any discussion of this topic is usually the “contract failure” 
approach developed by Hansmann (1980), on which most subsequent studies are based.   
                                                                                                                                                                      
the long-term care market.  5
Hansmann argues that, due to the asymmetry of information between consumers and providers, 
consumers are not able to observe the quality of  services.  This  situation  provides  room  for 
opportunistic behavior by for-profit operators who might be tempted to raise profits by lowering 
the quality of services.    In contrast, nonprofit operators, Hansmann argues, are subject to 
“non-distributional constraints,” i.e. they are prohibited from distributing net earnings and thus 
operating subject to very different incentives.    The “non-distributional constraints” argument 
encompasses two earlier key hypotheses that seek to explain the (potential) existence of wage 
premiums in the nonprofit sectors.    The first of these is labeled the “philanthropic wage-setting” 
hypothesis (Feldstein, 1971), or, in a later version, the “attenuated property rights” hypothesis 
(Borjas et al., 1983), suggesting that nonprofit managers have less incentive to lower wages since 
they do not have to make profits.    The second hypothesis highlights the relation between wage 
setting and quality control.    Newhouse (1970) argues that managers in the not-for-profit sector 
have less incentive to lower the quality of service provided since this is what their performance is 
judged on, or they desire to show professional excellence or technical virtuosity by stressing 
quality.
3  
However, there are also arguments giving reasons why nonprofit wages should in fact be 
lower than those in the for-profit sector.    One example is the “labor donation” argument, which 
suggests that employees in the nonprofit sector place a lower value on money and a higher value 
on non-monetary benefits such as working conditions or social responsibility (Rose-Ackerman, 
1996; Preston, 1989).    Another explanation is that nonprofit enterprises are concentrated in 
less-profitable sectors (Lakdawall et al., 1998).   
Many researchers have attempted to assess quantitatively wage and quality differentials 
                                                   
3  Yet another hypothesis suggests that the nonprofit wage premium can be attributed to the exemption from 
taxes or governments’ preferential treatment of the nonprofit sector (Frank and Salever, 1994).  6
between the two sectors.    However, it seems fair to say that the empirical findings for the U.S. 
are inconclusive.    While some studies observe a significant wage premium, others do not find a 
significant wage differential.    One approach to tackle the question has been to investigate 
overall and within-industry wage differentials.    Proceeding along these lines, Leete (2001), for 
example, examines economy-wide wage differentials between nonprofit and for-profit employees.   
Another approach is to investigate wage differentials in specific sectors.    Research along these 
lines looking at the nursing home and day care industries, however, has failed to produce 
conclusive results.
 4  Borjas et al. (1983), for example, find evidence of a wage premium in the 
nursing home industry and argue that this result is consistent with the attenuated property rights 
explanation.    Similarly, Preston (1988) provides evidence suggesting that employees of federally 
regulated nonprofit daycare centers enjoy a wage premium.   
Despite the academic and practical importance of the issue, there has been very little 
research on the existence (or otherwise) of wage premiums in the nonprofit sector in Japan, either 
in the elderly care market or elsewhere.    A major reason for the lack of such research is the 
simple fact that there are few markets in Japan’s service sector where both nonprofit and 
for-profit  enterprises  compete.  Another  reason,  however, has been the lack of micro-level data 
allowing to control for heterogeneity in worker and establishment characteristics, which, as 
pointed out in previous research, is a crucial prerequisite for the examination of wage 
differentials.    These problems have hampered any research into wage differentials between 
nonprofits and for-profits in Japan and as far as we know, the only study to date dealing with the 
issue is that by Noguchi et al. (2003), which found a nonprofit wage premium in the child-care 
industry.   
                                                   
4  Other applications can be found in studies by Weisbrod (1983) and Godderies (1988), who investigate wage 
differentials between private-profit and public-interest lawyers.    7
This study aims to fill some of this gap by looking at the nonprofit wage premium 
question in the market for at-home care for the elderly.    The issue is of both academic and of 
practical interest, and the present study attempts not only to search for explanations of the wage 
differential between nonprofit and for-profit providers that we find; it also considers policy 
implications which might be relevant in designing market competition in other sectors where 
entry deregulation is expected in the future, such as medical services.   
 
3.  The Japanese at-home care industry 
       Japan’s  market  for  elderly  care  underwent  fundamental  change  following  the 
introduction of the public long-term care insurance program in the 2000 (see Shimizutani and 
Noguchi, 2004; Mitchell et al. 2004).    Before 2000, only lower-income households were eligible 
to receive elderly care services provided by local governments as part of the social welfare 
scheme.    While the financial burden on users of such publicly provided services was negligible, 
households could not choose between providers or service contents and had to accept whatever 
the government determined.    Private long-term care (LTC) providers were allowed to offer their 
services, but because users had to pay out of their own pockets, this was an option only for the 
wealthy and the market for privately provided care services was consequently small.   
        However,  given  the  rapid  aging  of  the  Japanese  population,  the  government  introduced 
a new public insurance scheme pursuing the following four objectives (Ministry of Health, 
Labour and Welfare, 2002).    First, the approach seeks to mitigate the burden of home care for 
the elderly traditionally borne by women.    Second, the new system aims to make more 
transparent the relationship between benefits received and premiums paid.    Third, by integrating 
what had been a vertically-divided system of health, medical, and welfare services, the new 
program was designed to provide a means by which customers would receive comprehensive  8
services from a variety of institutions of their choice.    Fourth, by separating long-term care from 
health insurance coverage, the new insurance program seeks to reduce the number of cases of 
“social hospitalization” where elderly patients are hospitalized simply because of a lack of viable 
alternatives, which pushes up medical costs (Mitchell et al., 2004).     
              Under the new insurance program, once certified by the local government to be eligible 
for long-term care, all insured persons are entitled to use care services.    The new scheme thus 
considerably widens the range and number of care receivers and explicitly intends to provide 
both in-home services (at-home care) as well as services at facilities (institutional care).
5   
The insured are free to use elderly care from any provider, subject to a 10% copayment of 
officially fixed prices specific to each type of care service.
6    
  Turning to financing, the Japanese public LTC system is a pay-as-you-go program.   
Half of the cost of this scheme is financed by the long-term care insurance contributions from the 
insured (aged 40 and over) and the remaining half is financed by general tax revenues 
(Shimizutani and Noguchi, 2004; Mitchell et al., 2004).   
  At the same time, in order to meet rapidly increasing care needs, entry regulations were 
changed to create a more market-oriented system of provision.    That is, to stimulate the supply 
of elderly care services, for-profits are allowed to enter the at-home care market, though this is 
                                                   
5  At-home care services include (1) home-visit/day services (home-visit long-term care, home-visit bathing, 
home-visit rehabilitation, day rehabilitation (day care), home-visit nursing care, day service, welfare devices 
leasing); (2) short-stay service/short-stay care; (3) in-home medical care management counselling; (4) care 
service for the elderly with dementia; (5) care service provided in for-profit private homes for the elderly; (6) 
allowance for purchase of welfare devices; and (7) allowance for home renovation (handrails, removal of level 
differences,  etc.).  Institutional  care is described according to three types of nursing homes: (1) long-term care 
welfare facilities for the elderly (special nursing homes for the elderly); (2) long-term care health facilities for 
the elderly; and (3) long-term care medical facilities for the elderly. The last type also includes sanatorium-type 
wards as well as wards for elderly patients with dementia, and hospitals with enhanced long-term care service 
provision.  Medical  care,  per se, is not included in the LTC program but instead is offered under the national 
healthcare system (Mitchell et al., 2004). 
6  However, there is a limit to the amount of care that is covered by the insurance scheme.    Any care services 
beyond that limit, which depends on the care category which a user is assigned by the government, must be  9
not the case for the institutional care market.    Under the public elderly-care program, care 
providers are not able to set their prices freely since uniform nationwide rates are stipulated for 
all covered LTC services; in addition, services are standardized. The Ministry of Health, Labour 
and Welfare has assigned a given number of standard "units" for each particular service and then 
values each unit depending on the region to take regional wage differences into account.
7 Thus, 
the policy aims to introduce not price but quality competition in the market for at-home care.   
 
4.  Data 
The empirical analysis of this study is based on the “Statistical Survey on Nursing Home 
Employees” (Jigyosho Ni Okeru Kaigo Rodo Jittai Chosa) conducted by the Care Worker 
Support Center Foundation (Kaigo Roudou Antei Center) in November 2000.    The 
establishments in the sample are randomly chosen from all areas of Japan.    The dataset provides 
information on various characteristics of both workers and facilities.    The notable merit of this 
survey is that it collects information on wages and other characteristics from all employees in 
each establishment.
8    It contains observations on a total of 39,261 employees with various 
qualifications, out of which we extract observations on employees with qualifications as a 
home-helper or staff nurse, for a total of 6,075 home-helpers (24.3% of the total) and 3,686 staff 
nurses (14.8%) of the total.    In the dataset, nursing care providers are divided into seven 
categories: for-profit providers, and six types of not-for-profit provider, i.e., social welfare 
corporations, medical corporations, authorized non-profit organizations (NPOs), Co-ops, 
agricultural cooperatives, and other charitable corporations.    Our observations are distributed as 
                                                                                                                                                                      
paid for by the user at full cost up to “stop-loss” threshold called the “high-cost long-term care service limit.”   
7  Currently a unit is worth ¥10.00-10.72.   
8  However, if the number of employee was greater than 50, then the manager of the establishment randomly 
selected 50 employees for the survey.    10
follows: Of the 1,959 observations in the proprietary sector, 1,633 are home helpers, while 326 
are staff nurses. Of the 7,802 observations in the nonprofit sector, 4442 are home helpers, while 
3,360 are staff nurses.   
Table 1 presents summary statistics of the characteristics of both employees and facilities.     
The statistics provide an indication of similarities and differences between the for-profit and the 
nonprofit sector in the Japanese nursing industry.    The mean daily wage is approximately one 
percentage point higher in nonprofit than in proprietary facilities, though the difference is not 
statistically significant.
9    The first notable difference in worker characteristics is in the age 
structure.    In the nonprofit sector, those aged 40 to 49 make up the largest age group in both 
occupations, while in the for-profit sector, 30 to 39-year-olds make up the largest group among 
staff nurses and 50 to 59-year-olds the largest group among home helpers.    Unfortunately, we do 
not have information on factors such as experience, education, or marital and family status, which 
ideally should be controlled for.    However, age can be used as a proxy for years of experience, 
while employees’ qualifications may be taken to reflect education.    Nonprofit facilities seem to 
prefer home helpers and staff nurses on a full-time basis.    Consequently, the ratio of part-time 
regular home helpers is also higher in the not-for-profit sector, while proprietary operators favor 
part-time regular staff nurses.  
We also examine various facility characteristics that might affect wage rates.    First, 
looking at the number of employees, we do not observe a particular difference between the 
for-profit and the not-for-profit sector.  Second,  70-80%  of  the  facilities respond that they are 
currently hiring home helpers and staff nurses and the retention rate is high.    However, for-profit 
                                                   
9  The mean daily wages for home helpers and staff nurses in for-profit homes are 8,688 yen and 8,685 yen 
respectively, while in not-for-profit homes they are 11,045 yen and 11,062 yen.    Note that some workers are 
paid wages on a monthly or hourly basis.    Since the data also include the number of working days and the 
length of working hours in September 2000, we calculated daily wages based on this information.      11
operators currently hiring workers report a higher turnover rate both for full-time and part-time 
workers.    We also have several variables measuring the non-wage benefits provided by 
different types of facilities.    For-profit providers more frequently offer non-wage benefits such 
as work-related accident compensation insurance and health insurance than nonprofit facilities.   
If we compare the benefits of full-time and part-time employees, most full-time employees are 
more likely than part-timers to be offered work-related accident compensation and health 
insurance by both types of providers.    Finally, nonprofit providers offer various benefits, 
including professional training inside and outside the facility, additional pay on top of the basic 
salary, health examinations, subsidies for uniforms and equipment, and preventive care for 
work-related back pain and accidents.     
 
5.  Wage differentials between for-profit and nonprofit care providers 
This section uses the dataset to estimate the wage function to examine the earnings 
differentials between nonprofit and for-profit care providers.    When assessing wage differentials 
between the for-profit and the not-for-profit sector, the selection bias of sector affiliation of 
workers and other unobservable characteristics that affect wage rates should be corrected for.   
Suppose that one type of provider offers higher wages for its employees.    The wage differential 
cannot be totally attributed to providers’ for-profit or nonprofit status, because the different 
providers may attract different types of employees, with different unobserved characteristics that 
account for higher or lower productivity and thus higher or lower observed wages.    In order to 
address this selection bias, we apply Heckman’s two-stage approach to obtain unbiased estimates 
of the parameters (Lee, 1978; Heckman, 1979; Willis and Rosen, 1979; Greene, 1981).    We 
estimate the wage equation in the second stage separately for for-profit and nonprofit providers 
since wages in the two sectors are affected differently by the same worker characteristics as a  12
result of some of the organizational characteristics of nonprofits such as non-distributional 
constraints or preferable tax treatment. 
      Concretely,  we  estimate  the  following  two  equations  simultaneously  using  the  maximum 
likelihood  method.     
(1)  First  stage  regression 
Zi
*= Xiγ + ui 
Zi = 1   i f   Z i
*≥0  or  -  ui  ≤ X iγ  
Zi = 0   i f   Z i
*<0  or  -  ui  > Xiγ  
where Zi is a dichotomous variable and takes 1 if a worker actually chooses to work for a 
for-profit operator and takes 0 if an employee works for a nonprofit operator.    Xi refers to 
characteristics both of employees and of employers that might affect a worker’s choice of sector 
and  γ   represents the coefficients.    ui is an error term following  ) , 0 (
2
u N σ .  
(2)  Second  stage  regression 
Wi
1=Yi
1 1 δ +
1 1θ λi +
1
i ω   (for-profit) 
Wi
2=Yi
2 2 δ +
2 2θ λi +
2
i ω   (nonprofit) 
where Wi is the logarithm of the daily wage rate.    Yi refers to characteristics both of employees 
and of employers that might affect wage rates.    Moreover, 
     
1
i λ =  －φ (Xiγ / u σ )/Φ(Xiγ / u σ ) and 
2
i λ =φ (Xiγ / u σ )/[1-Φ(Xiγ / u σ )] 
     
1 θ = u 1 σ / u σ =cov(
1
i ω ,ui )/ u σ  and 
2 θ = u 2 σ / u σ =cov(
2
i ω ,ui )/ u σ  
where  i λ   is the truncated mean and  φ  and Φ  indicate the standard normal probability 





i ω )=0 where  i ω   is the error term.    Yi excludes several variables on non-wage  13
benefits included in Xi which explain employees choice of type of provider but not the wage rate. 
Both Yi and Xi also include prefecture dummies to control for regional differences.
10  
Table 2 reports the estimated coefficients in the first and the second stage regressions. 
The results for home helpers and for staff nurses are reported in separate columns.    The results 
of the sector allocation probit regression in columns (1) and (4) basically are a replication of the 
unadjusted comparison between the two sectors in Table 1.    The other columns in Table 2 show 
the estimated coefficients of the wage equations for proprietary and not-for-profit operators, 
corrected for self-selection bias.    Both for home-helpers and for staff nurses, wage rates are 
more correlated with age in the nonprofit sector than in the for-profit sector with wages for 
nonprofit sector employees peaking in the 50 to 59 age bracket.    If we assume that workers’ age 
is proportional to their years of experience, workers with more years of experiences tend to enjoy 
higher wage rates in the nonprofit sector. We also find that rewards for full-time and part-time 
regular workers are higher at not-for-profit providers than at proprietary providers.     
Turning now to facility characteristics, we do not find a clear relationship between the 
number of employees and wage rates.    Non-wage compensation appears to be a substitute.    For 
example, home helpers’ wages at proprietary providers are lower if these offer health insurance. 
Similarly, staff nurses’ wages at not-for-profit providers are lower if these offer accident 
compensation insurance.    Other non-wage compensation such as professional training also 
seems to be associated with lower wages, though most results on these variables are not 
statistically significant.   
Using the estimates in Table 2, we apply a simple decomposition analysis to the wage 
differential in order to uncover the contribution of differences in factor endowments and in factor 
prices of key explanatory factors.    The analysis follows Blinder (1973) and Oaxaca (1973) in 
                                                   
10  We constrain the coefficients on prefecture dummies to be equal in the regressions.  14
decomposing wage differentials to discern the relative strength of key explanatory variables in 
accounting for the wage differentials and the proportion of these effects due to sectoral 
differences in mean attributes and sectoral valuation of those attributes (coefficients) (Holtmann 
and Idson, 1993).   
Concretely, we follow Reimers (1983), who takes the unweighted average of each 
sector’s coefficient and mean: 
(3)  ( )( ) ( )( )
1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 5 . 0 5 . 0 β β β β − + + − + = − ∑ ∑ Y Y Y Y LWAGE LWAGE  
where the left-hand side variables are the summations of the contributions of each explanatory 
variable.  β   is the estimated coefficient on each independent variable including the selectivity 
terms in the second stage regressions.    A Y with a bar on top stands for the mean of each 
explanatory variable.   
The results are shown in Table 3.    The table shows that the summation of wage 
differentials between the nonprofit and the for-profit sector over all explanatory variables is 1.8 
percent (1,006 yen) for home helpers and 3.9 percent (884 yen) for staff nurses.    If we 
decompose the sectoral wage differentials, we find that worker-related variables contribute to 
greater wage differentials (see item (5) both under home helpers and under staff nurses).    If we 
decompose those contributions into the differences in attributes and coefficients, we find that the 
difference in coefficients accounts for the largest part of the nonprofit wage premium both for 
home-helpers and staff nurses.    These worker-related variables include workers’ age, their 
employment status (full-time or part-time), etc., which can be assumed to be related to 
productivity
11 
                                                   
11  Because the long-term care industry is still dominated by the nonprofit sector in Japan, one may wonder if 
wage differentials are greater within the nonprofit sector than between the nonprofit and the for-profit sector.   
We therefore also examined wage differentials between workers in nursing homes run by social welfare 
cooperatives and those run by medical cooperatives, which occupy the largest proportions (65% and 21%) of  15
The results obtained in this study suggest that there clearly is a nonprofit wage premium 
in the Japanese long-term care market, and it is the higher valuation of a number of factors, 
including workers’ age and status that contribute to this premium. These results are consistent 
with the “attenuated property rights” hypothesis which posits that nonprofit managers have less 
incentive to lower wages since they do not have to make profits.     
In order to assess what the welfare implications of the nonprofit wage premium that we 
found are, it would be necessary to address whether the premium in the nonprofit sector is 
associated with a higher quality of care.    While studies on the quality of care in the U.S. are 
inconclusive,
12  Suzuki (2002) and Shimizutani and Suzuki (2002) find evidence suggesting that 
in the Japanese long-term care industry the quality of services provided by for-profit providers is 
not significantly different from that provided by nonprofit counterparts.    Combining the findings 
of those studies with the results of the present study, it appears that from a welfare perspective, 
the higher wages paid by nonprofits represent an inefficient use of resources.   
 
6.  Conclusion 
Unlike in the United States, the nursing care market in Japan until recently was heavily 
regulated, restricting access only to nonprofit providers.    The introduction of long-term care 
                                                                                                                                                                      
total number of nonprofit long-term care providers.    The results show that home helpers working for providers 
operated by social welfare cooperatives enjoy an 8.5 percentage point (792 yen) wage premium over those 
working for providers operated by medical corporations.    In contrast, remuneration for staff nurses is 2.9 
percentage points (321 yen) higher among those working for medical corporations than those working for 
social welfare cooperatives.    The wage differential may be explained by the fact that long-term care facilities 
owned by medical cooperatives are more likely to focus on medical-related care such as outpatient clinical 
treatment and rehabilitation rather than on services catering to the daily needs of the elderly.    Our results 
corroborate the existence of wage differentials within the nonprofit sector, but these differentials are not as 
large as the ones between the for-profit and the nonprofit sector.   
12  There are several studies that find a better quality of services leading to higher wage rates in the nonprofit 
sector, including Weisbrod (1988), Ullmann and Holtman (1985), Cohen and Spector (1996), Holtman and 
Idson (1993), and Gertler (1989).    On the other hand, Gertler (1992) observes better quality in the for-profit 
sector.    The overall inconclusiveness of these studies can be partly attributed to the lack of consensus on  16
insurance in 2000 finally allowed for-profit operators to enter at least the home-help market.   
Thus, for-profit and not-for-profit providers have just started to compete in the long-term care 
market in Japan.    The reform was prompted by the governments’ aim to increase the amount of 
care provision to meet the growing demand generated by the rapid aging of the population. 
Closely linked with this goal, however, was also the desire to foster competition between 
different types of providers in the elderly care market.   
As we have shown in another paper (Noguchi and Shimizutani, 2005), following 
liberalization, for-profit providers have been able to make substantial inroads in the at-home care 
industry, and in the eyes of users, the quality of service provided by for-profit operators compares 
favorably with that of nonprofit operators. Given these findings, the results of this study yield 
important insights for the fine-tuning of government policy towards the deregulated market.   
Analyzing wage differentials between the for-profit and nonprofit sector in the at-home care 
market, this study provides empirical evidence indicating that there is a nonprofit wage premium, 
both before and after controlling for self-selection biases.    Combining this finding with that of 
other studies on sectoral differences in the quality of services suggests that the nonprofit wage 
premium is not associated with a quality premium.    Therefore, nonprofit operators’ wage-setting 
might be philanthropic, and the nonprofit wage premium may be not be justified by quality 
differentials across the sectors, as the argument by Newhouse suggests.    Rather, the nonprofit 
wage premium appears to be the result of “attenuated property rights” under non-distributional 
constraints. 
The policy implications of this study are clear.    For-profit nursing care providers, which 
were allowed to enter the long-term care market after 2000, offer equivalent quality of care at 
                                                                                                                                                                      
which variable is an appropriate proxy to measure quality, and different studies use different measures. 
  17
lower  labor  costs.  Thus,  the  government  should attempt to strengthen competition in the 
long-term care industry in order to make the care market more efficient, and it could try to do so 
by introducing policies that promote market entry by for-profit providers and help to overcome 
information asymmetries between service providers and consumers that retard the growth of the 
for-profit sector in this industry.     
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*: Reference indicator to be excluded from regression
Mean Standard Mean Standard Mean Standard Mean Standard
deviation deviation deviation deviation
I. Employee characteristics
natural log of daily wage 9.020 (0.305) 9.031 (0.269)  9.262 (0.311) 9.271 (0.285)
=1 if male 0.108 (0.310) 0.081 (0.273)  a 0.025 (0.155) 0.046 (0.209) b
=1 if 20<=age<30 * 0.157 (0.364) 0.189 (0.391)  a 0.181 (0.386) 0.153 (0.360)
=1 if 30<=age<40 0.158 (0.365) 0.165 (0.372)  0.294 (0.457) 0.290 (0.454)
=1 if 40<=age<50 0.236 (0.425) 0.336 (0.472)  a 0.221 (0.415) 0.340 (0.474) a
=1 if 50<=age<60 0.256 (0.437) 0.244 (0.430)  0.166 (0.372) 0.154 (0.361)
=1 if 60<=age<70 0.116 (0.321) 0.025 (0.157)  a 0.058 (0.235) 0.033 (0.179) a
=1 if full-time 0.460 (0.499) 0.639 (0.480)  a 0.577 (0.495) 0.834 (0.372) a
=1 if part-time, but regular  0.157 (0.364) 0.200 (0.400)  a 0.156 (0.364) 0.089 (0.284) a
II. Operator characteristics
=1 if total number of employees: <29 * 0.178 (0.383) 0.070 (0.254)  a 0.187 (0.391) 0.036 (0.186) a
=1 if total number of employees: 30-100 0.305 (0.461) 0.373 (0.484)  a 0.331 (0.471) 0.376 (0.485) c
=1 if total number of employees: 100-299 0.127 (0.333) 0.193 (0.395)  a 0.117 (0.321) 0.232 (0.422) a
=1 if total number of employees: 300-499 0.039 (0.194) 0.036 (0.185)  0.046 (0.210) 0.038 (0.191)
=1 if total number of employees: >=500 0.061 (0.240) 0.040 (0.195)  a 0.193 (0.395) 0.051 (0.219) a
=1 if provision of care plan making   0.745 (0.436) 0.874 (0.331)  a 0.859 (0.349) 0.864 (0.343)
=1 if provision of home-visit care 0.931 (0.253) 0.762 (0.426)  a 0.819 (0.386) 0.521 (0.500) a
=1 if provision of home-visit bathing 0.192 (0.394) 0.241 (0.428)  a 0.423 (0.495) 0.144 (0.351) a
=1 if provision of home-visit nursing 0.110 (0.313) 0.135 (0.342)  a 0.236 (0.425) 0.295 (0.456) a
=1 if provision of day care 0.118 (0.323) 0.642 (0.480)  a 0.230 (0.422) 0.592 (0.491) a
=1 if provision of day care rehabilitation 0.000 (0.000) 0.122 (0.328)  a 0.009 (0.096) 0.377 (0.485) a
=1 if provision of short-term stay 0.026 (0.158) 0.463 (0.499)  a 0.080 (0.271) 0.495 (0.500) a
=1 if provision of guidance in care management at home 0.007 (0.082) 0.060 (0.237)  a 0.000 (0.000) 0.156 (0.363) a
=1 if provision of rental care equipment 0.233 (0.423) 0.094 (0.292)  a 0.344 (0.476) 0.053 (0.223) a
=1 if work-related accident compensation insurance for full-time work 0.814 (0.389) 0.637 (0.481)  a 0.733 (0.443) 0.498 (0.500) a
=1 if work-related accident compensation insurance for part-time work 0.449 (0.498) 0.364 (0.481)  a 0.417 (0.494) 0.240 (0.427) a
=1 if health insurance for full-time workers 0.734 (0.442) 0.626 (0.484)  a 0.730 (0.445) 0.497 (0.500) a
=1 if health insurance for part-time workers 0.051 (0.221) 0.070 (0.256)  a 0.077 (0.267) 0.055 (0.228) c
=1 if professional training inside/outside the organization 0.716 (0.451) 0.825 (0.380)  a 0.727 (0.446) 0.868 (0.338) a
=1 if professional training outside the organization 0.112 (0.316) 0.119 (0.323)  0.104 (0.306) 0.088 (0.283)
=1 if no professional training 0.013 (0.115) 0.012 (0.111)  0.009 (0.096) 0.010 (0.099)
=1 if extra pay other than basic salary 0.653 (0.476) 0.766 (0.424)  a 0.653 (0.477) 0.810 (0.393) a
=1 if health examination 0.539 (0.499) 0.564 (0.496)  b 0.537 (0.499) 0.549 (0.498)
=1 if provision or subsidy for uniform or care equipment 0.765 (0.424) 0.873 (0.333)  a 0.859 (0.349) 0.887 (0.317) c
=1 if policy for preventing work-related back pain 0.254 (0.435) 0.439 (0.496)  a 0.316 (0.466) 0.401 (0.490) a
=1 if policy for preventing work-related accidents 0.214 (0.410) 0.246 (0.431)  a 0.230 (0.422) 0.233 (0.423)
=1 if professional training for managers in human resource division 0.242 (0.428) 0.303 (0.460)  a 0.175 (0.380) 0.309 (0.462) a
=1 if support for mental pressure at work 0.421 (0.494) 0.239 (0.427)  a 0.359 (0.480) 0.208 (0.406) a
=1 if hiring full-time workers and low staff turnover 0.707 (0.455) 0.705 (0.456)  0.690 (0.463) 0.777 (0.416) a
=1 if hiring full-time workers, but high staff turnover 0.121 (0.326) 0.069 (0.253)  a 0.178 (0.383) 0.076 (0.265) a
=1 if not hiring full-time workers * 0.055 (0.227) 0.099 (0.299)  a 0.031 (0.173) 0.035 (0.185)
=1 if hiring part-time workers and low staff turnover 0.532 (0.499) 0.591 (0.492)  a 0.445 (0.498) 0.616 (0.486) a
=1 if hiring part-time workers, but high staff turnover 0.219 (0.413) 0.157 (0.364)  a 0.206 (0.405) 0.146 (0.353) a
=1 if not hiring part-time workers * 0.026 (0.158) 0.042 (0.200)  a 0.012 (0.110) 0.021 (0.143)
Selectivity for daily wage (lambda profit)  0.290 (0.112) 0.010 (0.012) 0.029 (0.043) -0.007 (0.026)
Note: a-c indicate statistically significant differences between the for-profit and nonprofit sector means at the 5%, 10%, and 15% levels, respectively, 






Table 1: Key variable definitions and summary statistics
Home Helpers Staff Nurses
For-profit NonprofitDefinition Coefficient Standard Coefficient Standard Coefficient Standard Coefficient Standard Coefficient Standard Coefficient Standard
error error error error error error
=1 if male 0.204 (0.121)  b 0.138 (0.025) a 0.050 (0.012) a -0.334 (0.315) -0.028 (0.064)  0.037 (0.018) a
=1 if 30<=age<40 -0.264 (0.113)  a -0.010 (0.026) 0.056 (0.010) a -0.051 (0.169) -0.002 (0.029)  0.109 (0.012) a
=1 if 40<=age<50 -0.489 (0.105)  a -0.045 (0.024) 0.067 (0.009) a -0.230 (0.169) 0.040 (0.031)  0.185 (0.011) a
=1 if 50<=age<60 -0.329 (0.111)  a -0.012 (0.025) 0.127 (0.010) a -0.092 (0.190) 0.040 (0.033)  0.219 (0.014) a
=1 if 60<=age<70 0.044 (0.170) 0.289 (0.115) a 0.090 (0.022) a -0.428 (0.282)  c 0.094 (0.048)  a 0.202 (0.023) a
=1 if full-time -0.363 (0.105)  a 0.184 (0.024) a 0.317 (0.011) a -0.610 (0.231)  a 0.231 (0.042)  a 0.477 (0.022) a
=1 if part-time, but regular  -0.335 (0.131)  a 0.063 (0.028) a 0.074 (0.013) a -0.366 (0.257) 0.121 (0.046)  a 0.206 (0.024) a
=1 if total number of employees: 30-100 -0.850 (0.112)  a -0.068 (0.028) a -0.010 (0.009) -0.094 (0.170) 0.175 (0.043)  a -0.042 (0.010) a
=1 if total number of employees: 100-299 -1.316 (0.143)  a -0.116 (0.034) a -0.030 (0.011) a -1.071 (0.251)  a 0.147 (0.052)  a 0.033 (0.012) a
=1 if total number of employees: 300-499 -0.890 (0.234)  a -0.210 (0.068) a 0.066 (0.023) a 0.650 (0.319)  a 0.219 (0.093)  a -0.025 (0.024)
=1 if total number of employees: >=500 -0.114 (0.183) 0.106 (0.042) a 0.050 (0.019) a 0.210 (0.278) 0.123 (0.056)  a 0.096 (0.021) a
=1 if work-related accident compensation insurance for full-time worker 0.943 (0.280)  a 0.159 (0.053) a 0.144 (0.030) a -0.115 (0.410) 0.104 (0.085)  -0.067 (0.031) a
=1 if work-related accident compensation insurance for part-time worke -0.017 (0.107) 0.016 (0.031) 0.015 (0.009) -0.363 (0.196) 0.015 (0.050)  -0.005 (0.014) a
=1 if health insurance for full-time workers 1.512 (0.496)  a -0.144 (0.037) a 0.075 (0.049) -0.045 (0.383) -0.085 (0.079)  0.053 (0.030) b
=1 if health insurance for part-time workers 7.376 (0.245)  a -0.074 (0.058) 0.089 (0.021) a 0.306 (0.264) 0.256 (0.064)  a 0.039 (0.019) a
=1 if professional training inside/outside the organization -0.361 (0.329) -0.102 (0.074) -0.037 (0.030) -0.341 (0.214)  c -0.060 (0.045) 0.018 (0.020)
=1 if professional training outside the organization 0.264 (0.350) -0.147 (0.080) b -0.029 (0.031) 0.151 (0.269) -0.120 (0.055)  a -0.013 (0.023)
=1 if extra pay other than basic salary 0.016 (0.093) - - - - -0.487 (0.148)  a -- --
=1 if health examination 0.079 (0.084) - - - - -0.062 (0.132) - - - -
=1 if provision or subsidy for uniform or care equipment -0.152 (0.110) - - - - 0.432 (0.186)  a -- --
=1 if policy for preventing work-related back pain -0.754 (0.099)  a - - - - -0.496 (0.152)  a -- --
=1 if policy for preventing work-related accidents -0.129 (0.098) - - - - 0.042 (0.169) - - - -
=1 if professional training for managers in human resource division 0.156 (0.107)  c - - - - -0.472 (0.164)  a -- --
=1 if support for mental pressure at work 0.418 (0.090)  a - - - - 0.303 (0.153)  a -- --
=1 if hiring full-time workers and low staff turnover 0.458 (0.109)  a -0.062 (0.036) b -0.017 (0.010) b 0.438 (0.219)  a 0.057 (0.053) -0.010 (0.012)
=1 if hiring full-time workers, but high staff turnover 1.377 (0.178)  a 0.058 (0.050) -0.072 (0.016) a 0.552 (0.286)  b 0.157 (0.061)  a -0.042 (0.019) a
=1 if hiring part-time workers and low staff turnover 0.091 (0.105) 0.046 (0.029) 0.012 (0.010) -0.761 (0.152)  a -0.057 (0.042) -0.002 (0.010)
=1 if hiring part-time workers, but high staff turnover 0.811 (0.145)  a 0.027 (0.036) 0.004 (0.013) -0.500 (0.211)  a 0.013 (0.044) -0.011 (0.014)
Selectivity for daily wage (lambda profit) - - 0.290 (0.112) a 0.206 (0.002) a - - 0.154 (0.007)  a 0.216 (0.003) a
Intercept -4.085 (0.631)  a 8.372 (0.144) a 8.802 (0.036) a -0.561 (0.981) 7.856 (0.198)  a 8.776 (0.099) a
Log likelihood -959.624 -877.089 -260.219 -359.223 -210.038 25.901
See Table 1 for comments on variables.
Notes:
(1) All regressions are also controlled for contents of services performed by operators and regional dummies.  
(2) Parameter estimates are reported with standard errors in parentheses.  a-c denote significance levels of 5%, 10%, and 15%, respectively.
(5) (6) (2) (3) (4)
Table 2: Wage and for-profit and nonprofit allocation regressions for home helpers and staff nurses
First stage Second stage (For-profit) Second stage (Nonprofit)
Home helpers Staff nurses
Second stage (For-profit) Second stage (Nonprofit) First stage
(1)real value
I. Home helpers
(1) The predicted wage for not-for-profit operators 9650.694
(2) The predicted wage for for-profit operators 8644.670
(3) The predicted wage differential due to attributes -33.919
                   Variables related to workers 411.042
                   Variables related to operators 14.313
                   Variables related to other factors -459.274
(4) The predicted wage differential due to coefficients 1039.943
                   Variables related to workers 627.306
                   Variables related to operators -506.495
                   Variables related to other factors 919.132
(5) Total predicted wage differential  1006.024
between for-profit and nonprofit operators
                   Variables related to workers 1038.347
                   Variables related to operators -492.182
                   Variables related to other factors 459.858
II. Staff nurses
(1) The predicted wage for not-for-profit operators 11031.572
(2) The predicted wage for for-profit operators 10147.429
(3) The predicted wage differential due to attributes -181.968
                   Variables related to workers 1322.018
                   Variables related to operators -162.095
                   Variables related to other factors -1341.891
(4) The predicted wage differential due to coefficients 1066.111
                   Variables related to workers 2631.132
                   Variables related to operators -1392.713
                   Variables related to other factors -172.308
(5) Total predicted wage differential  884.143
between for-profit and nonprofit operators
                   Variables related to workers 3953.150
                   Variables related to operators -1554.808
                   Variables related to other factors -1514.199
Note: (1)-(2)=(3)+(4)
           The worker-related variables include sex, age and status (full-time or part-time).
           The operator-related variables include all "operator variables" listed in Table 1.
           "Variables related to other factors include intercepts and the selectivity term.
Table 3: Decomposition analysis of nonprofit sectoral wage
differentials, by type of employee